In behavioral experiments, individuals are less likely to cheat at a task when the saliency of dishonesty is increased [Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008), Gino, Ayal, and Ariely (2009)]. We test a similar hypothesis in a real world setting by treating news about high-profile political scandals as shocks to the salience of unethical/illegal behavior and its consequences. We find that local corporate insiders engage in fewer suspect behaviors in the year after a political scandal is revealed. Their stock sales are less profitable and they are less likely to sell stock ahead of large price declines, suggesting less illegal insider trading. These patterns vary predictably with the level of media attention to scandal-related events during the scandal years. Locally headquartered firms also appear to engage in less earnings management following the revelation of a political scandal. However, these changes in executives' behaviors appear to be largely transitory and the evidence of suspect behaviors resumes in following years.
I. Introduction
One cannot go long without learning of new instances of business executives engaging in unethical or illegal behaviors. Recent examples include the large-scale frauds perpetrated by public companies during the stock market run-up of the late 1990s, the alleged misbehaviors of bankers who securitized and sold mortgage-backed securities, and corporate insiders who either traded on private information or passed it along to their outside associates. Previous literature has shown that executives' wrongdoings are costly to both shareholders and society.
Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2009) estimate a loss of $4.08 in reputational penalty for every dollar a company misleadingly inflates its market value. Kedia and Philippon (2009) show how earnings manipulations can amplify business cycles and cause the misallocation of resources.
The ubiquity and costliness of illegal corporate activity has motivated a great deal of effort to understand and, hopefully, minimize these behaviors.
With this paper, we attempt to further our understanding of the factors that impact executive behaviors. Experimental studies in psychology show that people modify their actions when the ethical content of behaviors is more salient to them; i.e., when ethical considerations are made to stand out in an obvious way. Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008) showed that individuals are less likely to cheat on a task that could lead to a monetary reward when they were first asked to write down the Ten Commandments. Gino, Ayal, and Ariely (2009) find that when a person's attention is merely drawn to ethical considerations before playing a game they cheat less. In that case, an actor pretending to be one of the participants asked aloud before the game began, "So, is it okay to cheat?" to which the experimenter responded "You can do whatever you want." However, works like these are routinely confined to contrived settings with small rewards at stake, and it is unclear the extent to which the results can help explain the actions of corporate executives in the business world.
We test whether executives in real world settings also appear to act more ethically/legally when their attention is drawn to real world examples of bad behavior and its consequences. To identify a quasi-experimental setting where this question can be evaluated, we focus on executives located in areas where a major political scandal is revealed publicly. We begin with a list of scandals identified by Puglisi and Snyder (2008) , and, in order to conduct the cleanest difference-in-differences tests possible, limit our analysis to those states that experienced just one major scandal over the period 1997 to 2006. This resulted in a sample of ten scandals that occurred from 2001 to 2006. They are summarized in Table 1 and Figure 1 , and include recognizable cases such as former House Majority Leader Tom Delay's relationship with corrupt lobbyist Jack Abramoff, and former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman's conviction for bribery and mail fraud in relation to alleged kickbacks from former HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy.
Political scandals receive a great deal of attention in the news and it is our expectation that the amount of exposure to a scandal is increasing in geographic proximity to where it occurred.
These high profile ethical and/or legal missteps are therefore more salient to local executives.
According to the reasoning and evidence of Mazar et al. (2008) and Gino et al. (2009) that individuals behave more ethically when the ethical considerations are made more salient, we hypothesize that this will cause local executives to modify their behavior -for the better -to a greater extent than those living further away, whose attention is not grabbed as tightly by public discussion of the inappropriate acts of others.
To test this hypothesis, we focus on two suspect executive behaviors: insider trading and earnings management. The fact that actions are being brought against a politician for illegal acts associated with public office should not impact the amount of attention paid by authorities to these white collar crimes. New cases against politicians may therefore represent an exogenous shock to the saliency of illegal behaviors and their repercussions, but arguably do not impact the actual probability of corporate insiders being prosecuted. It is thus plausible to interpret any change in corporate executives' trading behavior or in earnings management as resulting from shocks to their level of attention to the illegal acts of others.
The first behavior examined is corporate insiders' stock trading activities. Insiders accumulate private information about their firms as they oversee its day-to-day operations, and, at the same time, they own significant amounts of their companies' stock. Thus, they have both the ability and incentive to trade on private information. Previous research provides evidence that insiders sometimes trade on private information and their trades often predict future abnormal return. 1 However, under U.S. securities laws, it is clearly illegal for anyone to trade a stock based on private information that is relevant to its value. Because corporate insiders trade often and there are reasonably straightforward methods for evaluating whether their trades are informed, we can test whether their behavior changes when the inappropriateness and negative consequences of breaking the law are made more salient.
We examine changes in insider trading in the twelve month periods beginning when a local political scandal is revealed publicly. We start by evaluating the profits generated by insiders'
1 Previous research includes Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968) ; Jaffe (1974) ; Finnerty (1976) ; Seyhun (1986 Seyhun ( , 1992 trades, which can be viewed as a proxy for informed trading. In a difference-in-differences setting, we find that the returns to insider stock sales declines after the revelation of a local political scandal, suggesting that they are less likely to be motivated by private information. In the univariate test, we find that local insiders' sales are followed by average monthly abnormal returns that are approximately 0.80% more positive in the year following revelation of a political scandal. Controlling for month and firm fixed effects, we find that in scandal years the abnormal returns are 0.74% more positive following trades made by the full sample of insiders, and 2.14% more positive following the trades of top executives.
We also evaluate the likelihood that insiders trade when a profitable opportunity is presented. Again implementing difference-in-differences tests, we find that the odds an insider sells stock ahead of a large stock price decline is lower during the year following revelation of a local scandal. On average, the probability to sell in a month followed with a large decrease in price is 2% lower during the scandal periods.
Interestingly, we don't find similar results when evaluating insiders' stock purchases. In fact, we find some mixed evidence that local insiders' purchases are actually more profitable during the year following the revelation of a political scandal. We offer the following twofold explanation for this contrasting finding. For one, it is consistent with the general sentiment that it isn't as egregious for an insider to purchase their stock when they have information suggesting it is undervalued as it is for them to sell it when it is overvalued. Indeed, other researchers argue that there is greater litigation risk is associated with selling stock than with purchasing it on private information (Skinner, 1994; Brochet, 2010; and Chen, Martin and Wang, 2012) . Given the contrasting risks associated with informed purchases and sales, it is possible that insiders' increased awareness of the ethical and legal content of their actions has less of an impact on their informed stock purchasing activity. Second, it is also consistent with a desire to diversify away from their firms because they now feel more constrained from selling shares in the future ahead of price declines, which increases the costs of holding an undiversified portfolio. As such, they may not want to purchase shares and increase their holdings unless they are quite confident that it is a good investment. Consistent with these explanations, we find that during scandal years insiders are less likely to purchases shares ahead of price declines, but they are not more likely to purchase ahead of price increases. This pattern of behavior could cause more positive abnormal returns following purchases on average even though insiders were actually not more likely to buy their stock when in possession of private positive information about their firm. We find further that following the revelation of political scandals insiders indeed reduce their stock holdings in their firms by approximately 3% on average, suggesting the costs of holding a concentrated position are larger when profitable trading opportunities are restricted.
Further tests indicate that although insiders appear reluctant to sell their stock based on an informational advantage when unethical acts are more salient, the effect is largely temporary. This is demonstrated by regressions indicating that the evidence of restrained trading is apparent in the year that follows the initial revelation of local political scandals, but they are not evident in the second year following these events.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to identify a perfect setting to test social science hypotheses, so we must evaluate the extent to which our results are robust to alternative explanations. It is possible that corporate insiders may change their behavior in these settings in response to either a real or perceived increase in the probability of being caught engaging in illegal acts themselves. However, given that the authorities who investigate political corruption do not generally also investigate corporate white collar crimes, we would not expect for there to be an actual change in the likelihood of an insider trading or accounting fraud investigation.
2
Alternatively, it could be that the revelation of a political scandal and the attendant negative consequences causes corporate executives to become more acutely aware of the costs associated with wrongdoing. To the extent that this is the mechanism causing changes in observed behaviors, we would still classify it as a response to the increased salience of consequences.
To evaluate whether changes in insiders' trading behavior are in response to increases in the probability of being caught, we evaluate whether trading patterns during scandal years vary with the level of local media attention given to the scandal. In months with more local news articles about the scandals, insiders are both less likely to sell their stock and their trades are less profitable that sales in other months during the scandal year. During scandal revelation years, insiders are approximately 16% less likely to sell stock during months when local newspapers run an above median number of articles referencing the scandal. When they do sell stock in these months, their trades are followed by abnormal returns that on average are approximately 1.30% more positive than sales in other months during the scandal year. These results suggest that any changes in insider behavior is not in response to changes in the odds of being caught for wrongdoing since the level of law enforcement activities is unlikely to vary across such short time periods.
2 Political corruption is normally investigated by the Department of Justice or congressional ethics committees, whereas financial fraud and insider trading cases are normally brought by the S.E.C. and/or private parties. To the extent that the Department of Justice also investigates financial frauds or insider trading these investigations are conducted by different divisions than those prosecuting political corruption.
We turn next to whether insiders appear to also act more ethically on behalf of their firms when dishonesty is more salient. To do so, we focus on indicators of earnings management.
Following prior literature, we focus on two different measures: the likelihood of just meeting or beating earnings expectations, and the use of discretionary accruals. Prior research finds that firms appear to opportunistically manage their earnings in order to just meet or beat analysts'
forecasts in order to maximize their stock valuations (Hayn, 1995; Degeorge et al, 1999 Our work is also related to research that examines the deterrent effects of law enforcement activities. Several authors provide evidence that insider trading declines when countries begin enforcing their insider trading laws (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Bushman, Piotrioski, and Smith, 2005; DeFond, Hung and Trezevant, 2007; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009) . Recent work provides indirect evidence that informed insider trading declines when U.S. legal authorities allocate more resources to investigating insider trading (Del Guercio, Odders-White, and Ready, 2015) . There is also evidence of spillover effects such that cases dealing with financial fraud or insider trading have a deterrent effect on the same type of behavior at other firms (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011; Jennings, Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011; Cheng, Huang and Li, 2013) .
Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) also show that firms located closer to the SEC are less likely to restate earnings. In contrast to these other works, this paper considers how litigation for inappropriate acts in one context can have spillover effects in other contexts. The results suggest that when more attention is paid to politicians' inappropriate acts, the salience of dishonesty is increased and this has a positive effect on corporate executives.
II. Data and Methodology

II.a. Methodologies
Our main hypothesis predicts that insiders will engage in less negative behavior after being exposed to news of a local political scandal. To test this prediction, we employ a difference-indifference methodology, comparing corporate insiders' actions in the years after a political scandal is revealed to their behavior in other years. We focus on the year following the first announcement of a scandal since the salience of illegal actions should be most acute during this period, although we also test whether any change in behavior is more permanent. Insiders at firms located in a scandal state during the years the scandal is revealed represent the treatment group while firms in the other states 3 during the same time-periods serve as a control group of observations, allowing for a well-specified difference-in-differences approach.
We examine two activities where corporate insiders may misbehave: insider trading and earnings manipulations. For the insider trading analysis, we evaluate the overall profitability of insiders' trades and the likelihood that insiders trade ahead of price swings. Similar to Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) , we calculate abnormal returns as the excess of a firm's one month total return relative to the return on a portfolio of firms formed similar in size, market-to-book, and recent return momentum. Each month all U.S. firms in CRSP are categorized into 125 portfolios based on size and book-market quintiles using the Daniel et al. (1997) annual breakpoints, and quintiles of the rolling past 12-month returns. If the increased salience of dishonesty deters executives from trading on private information, we expect to find that their trades are less profitable during this period.
We next implement tests designed to identify whether insiders take advantage of profitable trading opportunities when they arise. To test for changes in behavior, we consider whether the odds of trading prior to large price changes are lower following the public revelation of a political scandal. To do so, we employ linear probability models to predict the likelihood of trading in the months prior to the price moves to a favorable direction. (Murphy, 2003; Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002) . Prior research finds that a disproportionately large number of firms just meet or beat analysts' forecasts (Hayn, 1995; Degeorge et al, 1999 ) and commonly interpret this as evidence that executives opportunistically manage earnings to attain these thresholds. We test whether firms are less likely to engage in this particular form of earnings management during the years when local political scandals are revealed by comparing firms' reported earnings to analysts' forecasts of earnings reported in the IBES unadjusted summary files (Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; McVay, Nagar, and Tang, 2006) . To generate an expected earnings benchmark, we take the last analyst consensus mean or median earnings forecast prior to the earnings announcement.
One of the ways that firms can manage their earnings to meet analysts' expectations is by manipulating the discretionary component of their accruals (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Jiang, Petroni and Wang, 2010) . We calculate quarterly discretionary accruals using the modified Jones (1991) model that includes an intercept term (the specifics of this methodology are discussed in Appendix A). We compare the use of discretionary accruals across scandal and non-scandal years by regressing the absolute value of level of discretionary accruals onto a variety of control variables and an indicator variable for whether the quarter fell in a scandal year.
We include several control variables in the earnings management tests. Following
Summers and Sweeney (1998), we control for standard firm characteristics that could be related to the fraudulent misstatement of financial statements: Size, growth opportunities (Market to Book), Leverage, and profitability (ROA). We also control for channels of external monitoring, as previous literature has shown that outside monitoring affects earnings management. Yu (2008) finds that firms followed by more analysts manage their earning less.
Institutional investors also play important roles in preventing suspect earnings manipulations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Chung, Firth and Kim 2002) .
Therefore, we control for total shares of stock owned by institutional investors (Natural log of
Institutional Ownership) and the number of analysts following the firm (# Analyst Coverage).
Lastly, we control for extreme performance and cash flow volatility by including Growth Rate of Assets and Cash flow volatility (Dechow and Dichev 2002, Yu 2008) .
II.b. Data Sources
We obtain a list of political scandals from Puglisi and Snyder ( (2008) as the control group.
- Table 1 - Table 1 provides a brief description of each of the scandals considered, including the position, state of origin, and political affiliation of the political figures who were implicated.
Following Puglisi and Snyder (2008), we define the start date of a scandal as the first day of the month when it was revealed that an investigation was being conducted by a federal agency, a congressional ethics committee, or a state attorney general. A "Scandal Year" refers then to the 12-month period beginning with the start date of a scandal, and the other years are considered "Non-Scandal Years". In order to measure changes in insiders' trading behavior we include observations from three years prior to, and two years after, the scandal starting dates.
As a result, the overall time period examined in this paper is from 1999 to 2008. Figure 1 presents a timeline of the begin dates for the scandals during this period.
- Figure We obtain financial statement information and the addresses for firms' headquarters from Compustat, and return data from CRSP. In the final part of our analysis, we consider whether firms change their financial reporting practices in response to the revelation of a local political scandal. We use analysts' forecasts of expected earnings and actual reported earnings which are available in I/B/E/S for this analysis.
III. Empirical Results
III.A. Profitability of Insider Trades
We have hypothesized that corporate insiders will be less willing to trade on private information during the year a local political scandal comes to light publicly. In this section, we compare the abnormal returns following insiders' trades during the scandal years to those that are apparent in non-scandal years. Table 2 reports a univariate analysis of the one-month abnormal returns following insiders' trading months. On average, insider sales are followed by a -0.3% abnormal return in non-scandal years. In contrast, in the year following the announcements of local political scandals, insiders' sales are only followed by a 0.5% abnormal return (the difference is significant at the 10% level). We also contrast the returns following insiders' trades during scandal years to those at the same firms in the year after the scandal. In year t+1 following scandals, insiders' sales are followed by abnormal returns of -0.5% which are significantly lower than those following trades in year t at the 5 percent level.
These results indicate that insiders earn smaller abnormal returns in the year following the revelation of local political scandals, but that the contrast is less pronounced in the second year following the scandals.
A comparison of the abnormal returns following insiders' purchases tell a different story. Purchases are followed by positive abnormal returns during non-scandal years (0.9% overall and 0.03% during year t+1 following a scandal), but they are followed by more positive abnormal returns of 1.4% during scandal years. These differences, which are significant at the 1 percent level, are not consistent with insiders being less likely to buy their stock when they have private positive information when dishonesty is more salient. If anything, they suggest the opposite.
- suggests that the saliency of dishonesty has the greatest impact on firms' top executives. The samples for the regressions in Columns 5 and 6 are limited to the trades of directors and officers other than the top executives, and the results are similar to those for the full sample.
Panel B presents a similar analysis of insiders' purchases. Once we control for month, and firm effects, the coefficients on Scandal Year are insignificant in the regressions including the full sample of purchases (Columns 1 and 2) and those that evaluate the trades of directors and lower level officers (Columns 5 and 6). However, the coefficients on Scandal Year in the regressions evaluating stock sales by top executives are large and significant. It is 2.26% in the Column 3 regression, and 2.08% in Column 4. The coefficients on the variable Scandal Year + 1 are insignificant across all specifications, again suggesting that any saliency effect is shortlived.
- Table 3 Why might this be the case? A possible explanation may be related to insiders' incentives to diversify their portfolios if they perceive new limitations on their ability to trade profitably. Insiders maintain large, undiversified positions in their firms' stock and they also have large human capital investments in their firms. One factor in their willingness to maintain large equity stakes may be their ability to adjust that position downward when they receive information indicating they may face losses. If, once there is an increase in the saliency of dishonest behavior, they feel constrained in their willingness to sell shares when they have negative information, then the costs of being undiversified will be higher, and they will have incentives to limit the size of their positions in their firms. We would therefore only expect them to purchase their stock when they are confident it will not decline in value, which could be identified empirically as less buying ahead of price declines.
There is also reason to believe that insiders may be less deterred from purchasing their shares based on private information when the salience of dishonesty is increased. Other researchers have argued both that there is greater litigation risk is associated with selling stock and it is easier to identify harm associated with insiders withholding bad news. If an insider withholds negative information and trades, other investors will have identifiable losses when they purchase at an inflated price and the stock subsequently declines in value. However, if an insider purchases stock on private information, the only harm is to the investors who sold their shares and therefore weren't able to enjoy the extra gains the would have realized if the stock had already reflected the positive information. Insider stock sales can also be used as evidence in a suit claiming fraudulent financial reporting. However, it is less likely that shareholders will bring a successful derivative lawsuit claiming insiders fraudulently withheld positive information because their losses are best described merely as opportunity costs (Skinner, 1994; Brochet, 2010; and Chen, Martin and Wang, 2012) .
The next sets of tests we present focus on the relationship between the distribution of monthly returns and insiders' trading activity in prior months. This analysis could indicate whether during scandal years insiders are more likely to purchase shares ahead of price increases, or if they are merely more likely to avoid purchasing ahead of price declines as our reasoning above would predict. Following that, we test whether insiders change their level of holdings in their firms following the revelation of a local political scandal. If they are more likely to reduce their holdings, this would further support our analysis above.
Regardless, it remains possible that an alternative explanation drives the similar abnormal return patterns that we find for both sales and purchases under these circumstances.
This concern provides additional motivation for our analysis of earnings management practices. If those results are also in line with our expectations under the salience of dishonesty hypothesis, it will lend confidence to our interpretation of the insider trading results.
III.B. Likelihood of Trading
It is possible that the results from the prior section reflect differences in the monthly return distributions across years as opposed to changes in insiders' willingness to trade on private information. In this section, we present a supporting analysis that evaluates more directly whether insiders are less likely to trade when it would be profitable to do so.
Under the assumption that insiders have private information about the expected return distribution in the following month, we should find a greater likelihood of trading when the return in the following month is favorable to the trading strategy. Thus, after the outbreak of a local political scandal, we expect insiders to execute less trades in the direction which would be profitable.
We start with plotting the distributions of insiders' trades based on their monthly returns. As shown in Figure 2 , during scandal years, insiders only allocate 22.06% of their sales in the months before a big decline in price (more than 5% decreases), whereas they execute 6.81% more sales in the months ahead of large decreases in price during non-scandal years. The chi-square comparing these two frequencies suggests that they are statistically different at the 1% significance level (Chi(1) =32.58; P-value=0.000). This result indicates that insiders are less likely to sell before a negative price movement after a local political scandal is revealed, suggesting less willingness to trade on private information.
The plots for purchase trades have a similar pattern. Insiders are less likely to purchase before a price decline during scandal years, with a frequency of 17.82% during scandal years and 28.95% outside of the scandal periods (Chi(1)=32.58; P-value=0.000). In contrast, there is no evidence showing that insiders are more likely to purchase in the months which would yield large positive returns (5% or more) during scandal periods. The chi-square is 6.15 and is not statistically significant with a p-value equals to 0.013. As we predicted, insiders avoid to purchase ahead of a loss in order to keep their diversification risk low when the willingness of opportunistic trading is deterred.
-Figure 2-
To further investigate whether insiders trade before the prices move in a favorable direction, we estimate multivariate linear probability models, predicting the likelihood of trading when a profitable opportunity is presented. Again, we implement difference-indifference framework to focus on the effects on trading behavior that is imposed by the revelation of a political scandal. In particular, we categorize firm-months into three categories based on the returns in the following month: (1) the abnormal returns in the following month is less than -5%; (2) the abnormal returns in the following month is between +5% and -5%; (3) the abnormal returns in the following month is greater than 5%. All calendar firm-months during the full time period are included as observations in these regressions. We run separate regressions by defining the dependent variable as a dummy variable which equals 1 if a month is in one of the above categories, 0 otherwise. Under this setting, we are able to estimate the likelihood of trading ahead of different return outcomes. We then include a dummy variable
Trade, which equals one if it is a trading month, and 0 other. By interacting Trade with the dummy variable indicating that the month was during a scandal year, we can determine whether insiders had a different propensity to trade ahead of different outcomes when dishonesty was more salient.
Panel A of Table 4a reports the estimates of the linear probability models. The insignificant coefficients on Scandal Year*Trade in Columns 3 and 4 show no evidence of a change in insiders' selling activity ahead of large positive returns during scandal years.
However, the consistently negative and significant coefficients on Scandal Year*Trade in Columns 1 and 2 indicate less insider selling ahead of large price declines in scandal years. On average, insiders are about 2% less likely to sell before the price moves towards a negative direction (5% significance level).
- Table 4a These regressions also include interactions of Scandal Year+1 with the Trade dummy.
The coefficients indicate that in the second year after a scandal breaks local insiders are actually less likely to sell shares ahead of a large positive return, but the lower level of selling activity ahead of price declines is no longer apparent. These results are also consistent with those from the returns to trading analysis presented above suggesting that any shift away from bad behaviors during the scandal years do not persistent.
The patterns shown in the purchase trades confirm our expectations discussed above. In Panel B of Table 4a , the insignificant coefficients on Scandal Year*Trade across specifications in columns 3 and 4 indicate that insiders are not purchasing more shares ahead of large positive returns. In contrast, the negative and significant coefficients on Scandal Year*Trade in Columns 1 and 2 indicate a decrease in purchasing activity ahead of large price declines in scandal years. On average, the probability to purchase ahead of an increases in prices are 3%
lower after a local political scandal is revealed. This result is consistent with the observed distribution in trading and also further confirms our prediction in the prior section.
Given that the linear probability model may introduce estimating problems such as non-normality of the error terms or heteroscedasticity, we also estimate similar regressions using conditional logit models. As shown in Table 4b , the results are largely consistent with the ones estimated in the linear probability models.
- Table 4b We next consider whether insiders adjust their ownership of their firms' stock following the revelation of a local political scandal. As discussed above, we expect that insiders will diversify away from their companies if they feel restricted in their ability to trade their stock profitably. their holdings by 3.1% during the year. Similarly, the coefficient of -0.0319 in the second specification indicates a 3.13% reduction in the number of shares they hold.
- Table 5 -
III.C. Media Coverage of Scandals and Insider Trading Behavior
The evidence thus far supports a conclusion that corporate insiders are less likely to sell stock based on private information when the saliency of dishonest behavior is higher. In this section, we evaluate whether insiders' trading patterns and returns during scandal years vary as a function of the level of media coverage of the scandals. This analysis can possibly help rule out the alternative explanation that local insiders are merely responding to an increase (either actual or perceived) in the odds of being caught for white collar crime during these time periods because of higher levels of attention by law enforcement.
We begin by counting the number of local newspaper articles referencing the scandals in each state. For example, Figure 3 Coverage in column (1) indicates that insiders are 17% less likely to sell shares in a scandal year month with above median media coverage of the scandal. However, the result is insignificant with respect to stock purchases.
- The regressions indicate that when insiders do trade in high media coverage months, the trades are not as profitable. This can be determined by the significant coefficients on the interaction term Trade*High Coverage, which is positive and significant in the regressions explaining the returns to insiders' sales, and negative and significant in the regressions for purchases. The returns following sales (purchases) are about 120 bps higher (200 bps lower) when media coverage is high. The negative and significant coefficient on High Coverage in the regressions analyzing insiders' sales also confirms that these months are generally bad for local firms, and confirm the importance of controlling for this condition separately.
The results discussed in this section indicate that corporate insiders at local firms are less likely to sell their stock in months when media coverage of scandal-related events is elevated. The evidence that earn smaller abnormal returns when they do trade their stock in months with high media coverage suggests that they are less likely to be trading on private information. These results help to rule out alternative explanations for the main results above based on expectations of elevated law enforcement because this type of activity would not likely vary from month to month within the scandal years. These results provide stronger evidence in favor of the salience of dishonesty hypothesis.
III.E. Earnings Management
Up to this point, we have shown that suspect insider trading behavior declines after the revelation of a local political scandal. Those results suggest that insiders modify their personal behavior in response to an increase in the saliency of dishonest behavior. In this section, we extend the analysis to consider whether corporate executives also change the way they act on behalf of their firms under similar circumstances. Our focus is on earnings management, which, as discussed in the introduction, is one of the more egregious ways that managers may mislead investors about firm performance and value.
We begin this section with a difference-in-differences analysis of firms' earnings surprises. As demonstrated by prior research, firms appear to manage their earnings in order to just meet or beat analysts' forecasts in order to either keep investors from pushing their stock price downward (if they manage earnings up to the threshold) or to reserve slack that can be used to attain thresholds in the future (when they manage earnings down to the threshold). In Panel A of Table 7 we evaluate the statistical significance of these patterns. In years when scandals are revealed, local firms just meet or beat the median earnings forecast 32.8%
of the time compared to 39.2% of the time in other years, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Similar results obtain when considering surprises relative to the mean of analysts' forecast. The reversed pattern for earnings falling just outside of this window during scandal years is also significant. During scandal years, firms report earnings that either miss analysts' expectations by 1 to 5 cents or beat expectations by 2 to 6 cents approximately 4 percent more often (one percent significance). These results suggest that firms are less likely to manage earnings into the narrow range of just meeting or beating analysts' expectations when wrongdoing and its consequences are more salient.
-Figure 4-
We also compare firms' likelihood of just meeting or beating analysts' forecasts in scandal years to the likelihood in the following year. They are actually slightly less likely to report earnings in this narrow range in the second year after a local scandal is revealed, but the difference is not statistically significant.
A multivariate regression analysis of earnings surprises is presented in Table 8 . Using both linear probability model and conditional logit model, we predict whether firms report earnings that meet or just beat earnings forecasts after controlling for common determinants of earnings surprises identified by prior researchers and discussed in Section 2. We also present specifications that include quarter and firm fixed effects. The results are largely consistent with the univariate analysis of earnings surprises. The coefficients on Scandal Year are consistently negative and significant across all specifications, indicating that local firms are less likely to report earnings that fall into this narrow range in the year when a political scandal is first publicized. Consistent with results from insider trades, this effect does not hold in the year following the scandal year, as evidenced by the insignificant coefficient on Scandal Year + 1 in all specifications.
- Tables 7 and 8 Panel B of Table 7 presents the univariate analyses of discretionary accruals.
Comparing to non-scandal years, firms use less discretionary accruals when a political scandal is revealed. The difference is 0.036 and significant at 10% level. In Table 9 , we observe similar patterns in discretionary accruals using a multivariate linear regression. The independent variable of interest is again Scandal Year. The coefficients on Scandal Year are statistically significant when including common determinants found to be related to the use of discretionary accruals (Column 2). However, after controlling for firm and quarter fixed effects, the coefficient on Scandal Year becomes insignificant but remains negative (Column 3). Consistent with earnings surprises, this analysis also suggests that firms are less likely to manipulate earnings by using greater discretionary accruals in the year following public revelation of a local political scandal.
- Table 9 -
IV. Conclusion
We present evidence that corporate insiders react to the public revelation of the unethical behaviors of others by acting more honestly themselves. We show that the saliency effect proposed and supported by Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008) and Gino, Ayal, and Ariely (2009) in their experimental work appears to hold in the real world as well. In particular, corporate insiders appear to execute fewer informed stock sales and to engage in less earnings management on behalf of their firms after the revelation of a local political scandal. However, the salience of dishonesty appears to have only a temporary effect on insiders, as the evidence of informed stock sales and earnings management pick back up in the second year after a political scandal has been revealed.
This paper furthers our understanding of the reasons why individuals engage in illegal or antisocial behaviors. It sheds light on whether and how the actions taken by business professionals reflect the extent to which their attention is drawn to societal rules about the appropriateness of behavior and the consequences to engaging in illegal actions. It may also provide guidance on how to develop regulatory or legal regimes that more effectively deter unwanted behaviors in the business community. For example, it suggests that it be reasonable to use taxpayer funds to advertise public service announcements in city centers and around corporate headquarters that remind the public about acts that are illegal or inappropriate. This tactic --or other similar alternatives --may in fact serve as low-cost means of deterring unwanted and costly behaviors, and, in turn, reduce the cost of investigating and prosecuting such actions after they occur.
Appendix A
We estimate discretionary accruals at the firm-quarter level using a modified version of the Jones (1991) model with an intercept term. This model employs a regression of total accruals on changes in sales and property, plant, and equipment to obtain the estimated values.
First, we calculate total accruals ( , ) as:
Where i and t index the firm and quarter respectively, ∆ , is the change in current assets, ∆ , is the change in current liabilities, ∆ ℎ , is the change in cash and cash equivalents, ∆ , is the change in debt included in current liabilities, and , is the depreciation and amortization expense. Next, we run the following cross-sectional OLS regressions on subsets of firms formed by two-digit SIC codes. 
Where, , −1 are total assets, ∆ , is the change in sales, ∆ , is the change in receivables, and , is the property, plant, and equipment. The coefficient estimates 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 from A2 are then used to calculate nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) as follows:
We then derive our measure of discretionary accrual as the difference between the predicted non-discretionary accruals and the total actual accruals as follows: Table 4a .
Predicting Trading Activity with Linear Probability Models
This table presents linear probability model predicting the likelihood of insider trading ahead of different return outcomes. All calendar months in our sample period are included for each firm. Column (1) and (2) are regressions in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the DGTW excess return in the following month is less than -5%. Column (3) and (4) are regressions in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the DGTW excess return in the following month is more than 5%. Column (5) and (6) are regressions in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the DGTW excess return in the following month is in between -5% and 5%. Trade is a dummy which equals 1 if firm insiders traded in that month, 0 otherwise. Months in which no trades were made are recorded as zero shares traded. Other variables are defined in Table 3 . Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses, and ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Month and firm fixed effects are included in all regressions.
Panel A: Sell < -5% >5% (-5%, 5%) (1) and (2) are regressions in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the DGTW excess return in the following month is less than -5%. Column (3) and (4) are regressions in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the DGTW excess return in the following month is more than 5%. Column (5) and (6) are regressions in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the DGTW excess return in the following month is in between -5% and 5%. Trade is a dummy which equals 1 if firm insiders traded in that month, 0 otherwise. Months in which no trades were made are recorded as zero shares traded. Other variables are defined in Table 3 . Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses, and ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Month and firm fixed effects are included in all regressions. 1, 2 , and 3) after revelation of a political scandal. Scandal Year+1 equals one for the second four quarters (4, 5, 6, 7) after a scandal is first publicized. Size is the nature log of market cap. Market to Book is the natural log of market to book ratio. ROA is the return on assets. # of analyst coverage is the number of analyst covering the firm. Institutional Ownership is the natural log of total share of stock owned by institutional investor.
Leverage is calculated as total liabilities scaled by total assets. Growth rate of assets is calculated by the change of assets scaled by lagged assets. Cash flow volatility is estimated by standard deviations of cash flow of a firm in the entire sample period, scaled by lagged assets. All non-binary independent variables are lagged one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 1,2,3 ) after a political scandal is first reported. Scandal Year+1 equals one for the second four quarters (0,1,2,3) after a scandal is first publicized. Size is the nature log of market cap. Market to Book is the natural log of market to book ratio. ROA is the return on assets. # of analyst coverage is the number of analyst covering the firm. Institutional Ownership is the natural log of total share of stock owned by institutional investor. Leverage is calculated as total liabilities scaled by total assets. Growth rate of assets is calculated by the change of assets scaled by lagged assets. Cash flow volatility is estimated by standard deviations of cash flow of a firm in the entire sample period, scaled by lagged assets. All non-binary independent variables are lagged one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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